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Real Property 
by Harold E. McIntosh* 
Introduction 
Many cases were decided in the field of real property during 
the period covered by the survey, but very few of them were 
decided in the California Supreme Court. There is one case 
of special importance that was decided in the Appellate De-
partment of the Superior Court. Only those cases thought to 
be of special significance are included in this survey, and 
legislation enacted during the period will not be discussed. 
Deeds 
Mecchi v. Picchi l is a case presenting a question concerning 
delivery of deeds. A father manually delivered two deeds 
to his daughters by a previous marriage, and· requested that 
* A.B. 1943, Colorado State College 1. 245 Cal. App.2d 470, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
of Education; J.D. 1948, University of 1 (1966). 
San Francisco. Professor of Law, Uni-
versity of San Francisco. Member, Cal-
ifornia State Bar. 
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they not be recorded until after his death. In each deed, 
the father reserved a life estate and referred to an affidavit 
executed contemporaneously with the deeds, which recited 
the motivation for the execution of the deeds.2 Subsequently, 
the father executed and recorded another deed to a portion 
of the same property, naming himself and his second wife 
as joint tenants. After the death of the father, the daughters 
recorded their deeds and brought an action to quiet title. 
At the trial, the daughters sought to introduce the affidavit 
into evidence, but, upon objection by the surviving spouse, 
the proffered evidence was rejected. The Court of Appeal 
reversed, holding that the affidavit should have been admitted 
because it was, in essence, incorporated into the deeds. The 
court noted that under provisions of the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure,3 verbal or written acts of the immediate grantor are ad-
missible to prove that the transfer was absolute or that the 
grantee took the deed subject to conditions. The court then 
determined that the affidavit and other evidence were sufficient 
to overcome the inference of nondelivery arising from evi-
dence that (a) the deeds were not recorded until after the 
grantor's death, (b) the grantor retained possession of the 
property, (c) the grantor paid the taxes, and (d) another deed 
was subsequently executed by him in an attempt to convey 
the property again. 
An interesting situation arose which for the first time called 
for the construction of certain statutes that seek to protect the 
health and welfare of aged persons in California when they 
enter into a contract for lifetime care.4 In Stenger v. Ander-
2. 245 Cal. App.2d at 477, n. 3: "The 
recitals read: 'I am doing this to clear 
my conscience, and to right a wrong 
which I have committed. My first wife, 
Domenica Picchi, died leaving a will 
which left all properties to me for my 
life and then to my two daughters above 
named, upon my death. I destroyed 
that will and testified in the Superior 
Court of San Mateo County . . . 
that I could not find a will and did not 
know of the existence of a will for 
Domenica Picchi. This was untrue and 
148 CAL LAW 1967 
I knew it to be untrue when I so tes-
tified, but I was not well at the time 
and my present wife, Maria Picchi, 
made me do it.''' 
3. See former Cal. Code. Civ. Proc. 
§§ 1850, 1870, providing for admissibil-
ity of acts or declarations which are a 
part of a transaction. 
4. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code § § 2300-
2360. In 1965, these sections were re-
numbered (Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 1784, 
§ 5) and now appear as §§ 16200 to 
16318. This legislation was designed 
2
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son,s an 86-year-old widow transferred property to another, in 
exchange for a promise to care for her for the remainder of her 
life. She then had second thoughts and brought an action to 
rescind the contract, which was granted by the trial court and 
affirmed on appeal to the California Supreme Court. The 
California Supreme Court based its decision on § 16300 of the 
Welfare and Institutions Code, which requires the person 
furnishing the life care to obtain a license. Former case law 
and statutes had held that the license was necessary only for 
institutional care, but the court gave credence to legislative 
policy that recognizes the unequal status of the parties and the 
vulnerability of the aged to exploitation, and found this con-
tract within the purview of legislative intent. Failure to com-
ply with the statutory requirements therefore rendered the 
contract invalid. 
Lundgren v. Lundgren,6 which involved the problem of 
priority, the court had to determine who held title where a 
mother had executed two deeds: the first, a quitclaim deed 
to a daughter; the second, a deed to a son. The daughter 
claimed that the son had given no consideration and thus could 
not a bona fide purchaser. The court said that the cir-
cumstances existing at the time of a transfer determine if the 
consideration is fair and adequate. Although the son paid a 
token price, he made repairs and permitted the mother to 
reside there. The property was so dilapidated that it could 
not be rented; the mother was unable to pay the taxes on the 
property. The consideration was held to be adequate even 
though the repairs and improvements were made after the 
giving of the deed. At no time did the son know of the prior 
deed. 
The daughter argued that to allow the son to prevail would 
be an unjust enrichment because the property had improved 
in value. The court held that the daughter was guilty of 
laches. She knew that the son was making repairs and im-
to prevent the infliction of harm to the 5. 66 Cal.2d 970, 59 Cal. Rptr. 844, 
elderly by those who are not fully qual- 429 P.2d 164 (1967). 
ified to care for them under proper 6. 245 Cal. App.2d 582, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
conditions and on reasonable terms. 30 (1966). 
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provements upon the property and took no steps to assert 
her claim for about 3t years. Title was quieted in the son. 
Descriptions 
Three cases decided by the Court of Appeal involved prob-
lems of description. In Saunders v. Polich,7 the court merely 
stated the general rule that a subsequent survey must be made 
from record of the federal government survey, and that the 
last federal survey is conclusive as a matter of law. In the 
absence of a comparison of the Department of Highways' 
field notes to those of the official survey, the state survey is 
insufficien t. 
Hixson v. Joness presented a unique problem in land de-
scription. The title company identified a parcel by plot map 
and then, without the consent of the parties, proceeded to 
describe the property by metes and bounds. The metes and 
bounds description called for the property boundary to run 
to the line of Third Street and then to run parallel with the 
line of the street. The street had been abandoned by the 
city, and Hixson brought a quiet title action against the city 
and claimed ownership to the center of the street. Section 
1112 of the Civil Code creates a statutory rebuttable pre-
sumption that a transfer of land, bounded by a street, passes 
title to the center of the street. The court was therefore con-
fronted with the problem of determining whether the metes 
and bounds description rebuts the statutory presumption. 
The trial court held, in accordance with prior California law, 
that a metes and bounds description controls, and is an ef-
fective rebuttal of the statutory presumption. However, the 
Court of Appeal reversed and stated that the statutory pre-
sumption may be rebutted by the use of the metes and bounds 
description only if the metes and bounds description was in-
serted in the exercise of free choice by the grantor. Since the 
description was inserted to compensate for the vagueness of 
the plot map description and not at the request of the parties, 
it would seem that unless there is evidence that a different 
7. 250 Cal. App.2d 136, 58 Cal Rptr. 8. 253 Cal. App.2d 959,61 Cal. Rptr. 
198 (1967). 883 (1967). 
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result was intended, a metes and bounds description does 
not overcome the statutory presumption that property lines 
extend to the center of the street. 
Another description problem concerning ownership to the 
center of a street arose in Murray v. Title Insurance and Trust 
Co.9 A deed had been drafted incorporating a reference to 
a plot map that showed that the street had been vacated of 
record. The problem raised was whether the title insurer 
was liable, as the policy did not cover the property to the 
center of the vacated street. The court considered a number 
of different problems arising from a conveyance with reference 
to a plot map and the problem of street vacation. It listed 
and discussed four types of conveyances that a grantor may 
make to a grantee.lO It concluded that, as between grantor 
and grantee, if the grantor did, in fact, own to the center 
of the street, the grantee would take, although the recorded 
map showed the street as abandoned. 
Landlord and Tenant 
Two landlord and tenant cases deserve mentioning. 
Weisberg v. Loughridgell involved a lease in which the tenant 
(T) was given the right to remove improvements and trade 
fixtures. T placed the improvements upon the leased 
premises. He later assigned the lease. The assignee (A) 
agreed to purchase the improvements, and gave T a chattel 
mortgage as security for the unpaid portion of the improve-
ments. Later, A subleased the premises to the defendant (S), 
who did not assume personal1iability for the payment of the 
chattel mortgage. T then brought a foreclosure action against 
the property after default in payment of the chattel mort-
9. 250 Cal. App.2d 248, 58 Cal. Rptr. 
273 (1967). 
10. The court considered "implica-
tions of coverage under four different 
types of conveyances: (1) a conveyance 
of property by reference to a map which 
shows a bounding street; (2) a con-
veyance by reference to a map which 
shows a bounding street, abandoned in 
fact but not of record; (3) a conveyance 
by reference to a map which shows a 
bounding street abandoned of record, 
when the grantor owns the property-in-
chief and the bounding strip and (4) the 
previous situation, when the properties 
are under separate ownership." (250 
Cal. App.2d at 252, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 
276.) 
11. 253 Cal. App.2d 472, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. 563 (1967). 
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gage. Shortly after the institution of the action, A and the 
landlord (L) agreed to a surrender of the leasehold estate. 
Surrender was not known to plaintiff. Land S, then entered 
into a lease of the premises. After the foreclosure action re-
sulted in a purchase by T, the defendant refused possession 
to remove the improvements. 
In the instant action brought by T to establish ownership, 
S relied on the principle that articles attached to the land 
belong to the owner after a lease comes to an end, and 
he therefore argued that the articles sought to be possessed 
belonged to the lessor and were part of the property leased 
to lessee. The court held that this is a general rule, but 
that it was not applicable here. The lessor had disclaimed any 
rights to the articles, and the court held that the rule was 
primarily for the benefit of a landlord. Here, the lease had 
come to an end by surrender. The rule between landlord 
and tenant is that a tenant should have a reasonable time to 
remove. This rule should operate in the same manner in 
favor of the mortgagee. The defendant also claimed title to 
the articles as the purchaser under a tax foreclosure proceeding 
against the improvements. The court dismissed this claim 
because defendant was under a legal duty to pay the taxes. 
Purchase by one who has a duty to pay nullifies the sale, and 
therefore, title was in the plaintiff. 
The other case, Buckner v. Azuli,12 represents a trend that 
affords more protection to tenants. The case, decided in the 
appellate department of the Superior Court of California, was 
an action for damages against a landlord. Contending that 
a constructive eviction had occurred when the leased premises 
became infested with vermin, the plaintiff prevailed in the 
trial court. The landlord appealed, claiming that the tenant 
had no cause of action because, in the lease, he had waived 
the statutory duty imposed by Civil Code § 1941/3 and that 
12. 251 Cal. App.2d Supp 1013, 59 must, in the absence of an agreement 
Cal. Rptr. 806 (1967). to the contrary, put it into a condition 
13. Cal. Civ. Code § 1941. Lessor fit for such occupation, and repair all 
to make dwelling house fit for its pur- subsequent dilapidations thereof, which 
pose. The lessor of a building intended render it untenantable, except such as 
for the occupation of human beings are mentioned in section nineteen hun-
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therefore the common-law rule controlled. The Appellate 
Department of the Superior Court refused to recognize this 
claim, holding that a provision for waiver of Civil Code 
§ 1941 must be strictly construed. It further found that the 
waiver in the written lease pertained only to one part of the 
premises and was therefore not material to the action because 
vermin infested the entire building. The court stated that 
even if the waiver were applicable, it would be invalid because 
it was against the public policy, as reflected by the housing 
regulationsI4 that require the landlord to keep the premises 
free from vermin. 
Cotenancy 
Several cases involving cotenancy deserve mention. The 
age-old problem of disagreement among cotenants leading 
to partition forms the basis for Felder v. Felder. 15 Parties 
involved owned 15/32, 1116, and 15/32 interests in the sub-
ject property. In the partition action, the parties stipulated 
that the property could be partitioned in kind, and they 
provided the general basis for determining the boundaries for 
the respective parts. The appellant contended that as a 
result of the survey conducted incident to the partition, the 
stipulated partition should be void because of mutual mistake 
of fact. The allegations of mistake and uncertainty arose 
when the parties discovered, after the survey, that the tract 
did not contain as many acres as they thought. The court 
held that the mutual mistake was immaterial where the mis-
take had been compensated for by a proportionate downward 
adjustment of acreage allotted to each. The division was 
fair and equitable as the two parcels represented approxi-
mately equal values. Moreover, the court said that the divi-
sion followed the stipulation of the parties except for the 
reduction in acreage. 
dred and twenty-nine. (Enacted 1872. 
As amended Code Am. 1873-74, c. 612, 
p. 245, § 205.) 
14. 8 Admin. Code § 17906. See also 
Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App.2d 
482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966); Pines v. 
Perssion, 14 Wis.2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 
409 (1961). 
15. 247 Cal. App.2d 718, 55 Cal. 
Rptr. 780 (1967). 
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Heber v. Yaeger16 represented a longstanding controversy 
between two cotenants. Each party held a life estate with 
the remainder interest owned by defendant, who was also in 
possession. The plaintiff sued for partition and an account-
ing, and the defendant was granted a summary judgment by 
the trial court. The Court of Appeal reversed on the grounds 
that there were triable issues of fact, such as the fact that 
a prior judgment in 1944 had provided for the means of ac-
counting between the parties, and that the plaintiff argued 
noncompliance with that agreement. Furthermore, as a re-
sult of an action pending in 1958, an agreement between 
plaintiff and defendant was entered into whereby the plaintiff 
promised to waive any future income from one of the three 
properties as long as it was operated as a citrus ranch, if the 
plaintiff would not be charged any portion of the cost or ex-
pense of its operation during the period. The defendant con-
tended on trial that this agreement constituted a waiver of the 
right to partition during the lifetime of plaintiff, rather than 
only during the time the property was operated as a citrus 
ranch, as indicated in the agreement. The court stated that 
the right to partition is absolute unless limited by agreement, 
express or implied. Here, the court could find no such waiver 
from the agreement although the right to profits was therein 
expressly waived. The court also held that the right to ac-
counting provisions contained in the 1944 agreement was 
not affected by the waiver, since the waiver pertained only to 
the citrus property and not to the other two parcels of property 
owned by the parties. 
The defense of adverse possession was raised in Russell 
v. Lescalet/7 an action for partition. The defendants, a 
husband and wife, had owned the property in joint tenancy. 
Prior to acquisition of the property by plaintiff, a predecessor 
in title of the plaintiff had acquired the wife's interest by a 
sheriff's deed issued under a writ of execution. The defend-
ants remained in possession of the property, paying taxes 
and otherwise treating it as their own. The court followed 
16. 251 Cal. App.2d 258, 59 Cal. 17. 248 Cal. App.2d 310, 56 Cal. 
Rptr. 353 (1967). Rptr. 399 (1967). 
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the general rule that if the tenant in possession does nothing 
more than occupy the premises, his possession is not adverse 
to the cotenant out of possession; the latter must have notice, 
actual or constructive, that the former's possession is hostile 
to him. Under the facts of this case, since the possession of 
the wife, who had no interest in the property, could not be 
considered separate and apart from that of her husband, 
the court held that no title by adverse possession could be 
acquired. 
In Moore v. Hall,18 the property in question had been owned 
in common by the judgment debtor husband and his wife. 
Plaintiff was the judgment creditor of the husband and, after 
levy and sale, became the purchaser of the property for $100. 
After the purchase by the plaintiff and before the time f()r 
redemption had expired, the husband conveyed his interest 
in the property to his wife. She thereafter redeemed the prop-
erty from the sale. The plaintiff then proceeded to levy 
against the property a second time. This levy led to a second 
sale to the plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed a quiet title action. 
The court made the distinction between a redemption by 
the judgment debtor, which revives the lien of the creditor, 
and the redemption by a successor in interest, which terminates 
the lien. The plaintiff further argued that although this is 
true, the purchase by the wife of the judgment debtor was 
nevertheless a fraud upon creditors. The court said that 
one of the primary purposes of statutory redemption is to 
force the purchaser at the execution sale to bid on the prop-
erty at a price approximating its fair value. There was no 
showing that the $100 paid by the plaintiff met this test. 
Title was quieted in defendants. 
Subjacent and Lateral Support 
Marin Municipal Water District v. Northwestern Pacific 
Railroad Compani9 is a case that the court calls one with 
no precedent in California and one that is a pure subjacent 
support case. Plaintiff's water mains were on the surface 
18. 250 Cal. App.2d 25, 58 Cal. Rptr. 19. 253 Cal. App.2d 82, 61 Cal. Rptr. 
70 (1967). 520 (1967). 
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of property, under which, at some time in the past, a railroad 
tunnel had been constructed. The tunnel collapsed causing 
damage to plaintiff's mains. The complaint alleged that the 
common-law rule of absolute liability applied and that the 
railroad was liable. The court stated: 
At common law, where one person owns the surface 
of land and another the subjacent land, the owner of the 
surface is entitled to have it remain in its natural condi-
tion, without subsidence by reason of the subsurface 
owner's withdrawal of subjacent support. . . . The 
same authorities agree that the common-law right of sub-
jacent support is closely analogous to that of lateral 
suport. Under all the authorities, also, the 
common-law obligation of subjacent support is "abso-
lute" [and] the common-law obligation of lateral support 
is similarly "absolute."2o 
The court then distinguished the two obligations by saying 
that support is lateral where the supported land and the sup-
porting lands are divided by a vertical plane; support is sub-
jacent where the supported land is above and the supporting 
land is beneath it. 
The water district contended that the common-law rule of 
absolute liability for deprivation of subjacent support is still 
law in California. The railroad asserted that the legislature 
changed the rule by enactment of Civil Code § 832. The 
court held that Civil Code § 832 applied only to coterminous 
surface landowners; five reasons for this limitation were given: 
( 1) Civil Code § 832 frees an owner from absolute liability 
for lateral support. (2) Civil Code § 832 declares entitle-
ment of a coterminous owner to support from adjoining land. 
Both "coterminous" and "adjoining" import a common 
boundary, but "coterminous" denotes the same or coincident 
boundary while "adjoining" denotes touching or contiguous. 
On the surface of the land, it is feasible that such a boundary 
can be drawn. This relationship cannot be drawn between 
surface and subsurface ownerships. Thus, by the use of 
20. 253 Cal. App.2d at 87, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. at 524. 
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"coterminous" and "adjoining" in Civil Code § 832, the stat-
ute is limited to surface ownerships. (3) Civil Code § 832 
also applies to excavations on, and not underneath, the land. 
Again, this applies to surface owners only. (4) Section 832 
is found in the division of the Civil Code entitled "Bound-
aries." Boundaries are characteristic of surface ownership of 
land, and other sections in that division of the code refer to 
surface owners. (5) Subjacent support applies mostly to min-
ing cases. California legislative history shows that surface 
protection statutes were part of the early code but were not 
included in Civil Code § 832, and that the mining statute 
was finally abolished in 1933 as obsolete. 
The railroad then contended that the common-law .ru1e 
applies to land in its natural condition, and thus does not 
protect the mains because they are structures. The court 
stated that this is generally true, but that the authorities and 
cases on the point say the right is not lost unless the downward 
pressure of the weight of the structures contributed to the 
subsidence. The burden to show this is on the railroad and 
is a matter of affirmative defense and proof. Thus, Cali-
fornia follows the absolute liability doctrine with regard to 
subjacent support, and has a pure subjacent-support case as 
authority. 
An enjoyable footnote to the fifth reason listed above is 
purely historical. 
The 1871 [Code] commission itself was unquestionably 
versed in the problems of subjacent support of land in 
mining operations. Charles Lindley, one of its three 
members, was a pioneer mining lawyer in California and 
Nevada. Curtis H. Lindley, his son and later the author 
of Lindley on Mines, became the commission's secretary 
in early 1872. History's full circle may be closed with 
the note that one of the younger Lindley's notable accom-
plishments in later life was the organization of the Marin 
Municipal Water District, appellant herein. (Colby, 
Curtis Holbrook Lindley (1850-1920) 9 Ca1.L.Rev. 
87.)1 
1. 253 Cal. App.2d at 94, 61 Cal. 
Rptr. at 548. 
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Security Problems 
California is a big state, with a large population. It appears 
that the problems involved in financing real estate transac-
tions constitute one of the largest areas of litigation, and the 
cases are diverse. Some are good cases, some are bad, and 
some merely reinforce the factor of bigness. 
Jones v. Sacramento Savings and Loan Association2 is per-
haps an outstanding example of the problem. Thirteen lots 
were sold. Purchase-money deeds of trust provided that they 
would be subordinated to construction loans under certain 
conditions. Defendant made loans under these provisions. 
Notes on both purchase-money security and construction-
loan security were defaulted. The beneficiary under purchase-
money notes caused notice of default and sale to take place 
on six of the lots involved. The beneficiary under the construc-
tion-money notes caused notice of default to be given and sale 
to take place on eleven of the lots involved, six of which had 
already been sold under the first sale. The plaintiff was a 
purchaser under purchase-money notes and sued to quiet title. 
The court held that provisions for subordination under pur-
chase-money notes were not complied with, and that the 
defendant did not acquire any interest that was superior to 
that of plaintiff as a result of the sales. Thus, as to the sales 
made by the plaintiff, the interest of the defendant was termi-
nated. As to the sales that the defendant made, the interest 
of the plaintiff was unaffected. However, the court did go 
on to grant the defendant's request that an equitable lien 
be asserted against the plaintiff's interest in the property on 
the basis of unjust enrichment. A general doctrine of equity 
permits imposition of an equitable lien where the claimant's 
expenditure has benefited another's property under circum-
stances entitling the claimant to restitution. A specific appli-
cation of the doctrine occurs when a lender advances money 
that benefits the land of another in mistaken reliance upon 
an imperfect mortgage or lien upon that land. 
2. 248 Cal. App.2d 522, 56 Cal. Rptr. cussion of this case, see York, REM-
741 (1967). For a more exhaustive dis- EDIES, in this volume. 
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One would have to say that the case is remarkable for its 
result. Perhaps the court was influenced by the fact that the 
purchase-money notes were for about $800 for each lot, 
purchased before sale by plaintiff at a discount, whereas the 
construction loans were for approximately $12,000 for each 
lot. It seems that the unjust enrichment rule should not apply 
here. 3 The lender knew that the property was subject to 
purchase-money notes that had provisions for subordination. 
According to facts presented to the court, when the lender 
issued escrow instructions asking for subordination to be se-
cured, the title company involved refused to issue insurance 
covering the deeds unless it received additional subordination 
agreements from the trustee of the purchase-money trust deeds. 
The defendant then withdrew the escrow, and another title 
company became the escrow depositary. At this point, the 
defendant seems to have been proceeding at its own risk. 
Later, when the sales of the property were to take place, 
there was no attempt by the defendant to reinstate or to 
challenge the sale made by the purchase-money beneficiary. 
Perhaps the fact that Jones was not the original holder of 
the purchase-money notes might have made a difference. 
The court stated that when Jones bought the notes, he knew 
that the property was being improved as a result of the 
construction loans. However, the court found that that fact 
did nothing except raise the equity in the defendant. The 
question is: How far will this case go as precedent in other 
cases where the lender acts this recklessly, but yet wishes to 
be protected against its own actions? 
Another application of the problem of subordination arose 
in Pollack v. Tiano.4 A vendor entered into an agreement 
to sell property and to subordinate the vendor's security inter-
est in the property to a construction lender's lien. The con-
struction loan did not comply with the terms of the subordi-
nation agreement, and the vendor refused to execute the 
subordination papers. At this point, the lender refused to 
3. Estate of Pitts, 218 Cal. 184, 22 99 (1914); and see 17 CAL. L. REV. 
P.2d 694 (1933); Smith v. Anglo- 412. 
California Trust Co., Beckwith v. 4. 253 Cal. App.2d 221, 61 Cal. Rptr. 
Sheldon, 168 Cal. at 746-47, 145 P. at 235 (1967). 
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make the loan, and the purchaser refused to make the down 
payment as agreed. The purchaser then brought an action 
for specific performance of the contract to sell and in the 
alternative for damages. The vendor filed a cross complaint 
for damages for failure to perform the agreement. The court 
awarded the vendor damages on the cross complaint and 
denied recovery to plaintiff. The case is an example of the 
problems that can arise when property is purchased with a 
small down payment and financing is obtained upon the 
vendor's agreement to subordinate his security interest. The 
failure in this. case is that the purchaser wanted to use a 
portion of the construction loan to pay for the property, 
which was clearly not within the terms of the agreement. 
Other cases in this area involve anti deficiency problems. 
Powell v. Alber5 was concerned with a land sale contract 
which provided that upon default by the purchaser, the entire 
purchase price would become due, or the purchaser would 
forfeit the contract and execute a quitclaim of all his rights, 
title, and interest in the property to the vendor. The court 
stated that these provisions were merely attempts to waive 
the anti deficiency provisions contained in the Code of Civil 
Procedure,6 and that such waivers are contrary to public policy 
and unenforceable. 
Another waiver attempt was made in Loretz v. Cal-Coast 
Development Corporation.7 The note used to purchase prop-
erty was secured by a deed of trust on property other than 
that being purchased. The note also provided for an agreed 
valuation of the security property. Upon default, the security 
property was sold for an amount less than the agreed valua-
tion. The holder of the note sued for the difference, claiming 
that the extent of the value stated over the price received 
at the trustee's sale was equivalent to a second unsecured 
note. The court held that the agreed valuation provision 
was tantamount to a waiver of the antideficiency statute and 
therefore void as against public policy. 
5. 250 Cal. App.2d 485, 58 Cal. Rptr. 7. 249 Cal. App.2d 176, 57 Cal. Rptr. 
657 (1967). 188 (1967). 
6. Cal. Code Civ. Proe. § 580d. 
160 CAL LAW 1967 
14
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1967, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1967/iss1/8
Real Property 
However, in Jonathan Manor, Inc. v. Artisan, Inc. s and 
Van Vleck Realty v. Gaunt,9 unsecured notes were sued upon 
by the holders, who prevailed over the attempted application 
of the antideficiency defense. The result seems correct in 
Jonathan, since the holder specifically provided in the escrow 
agreement that the notes were to be unsecured; subsequent 
transfers of three of the notes made it clear that those three 
were the only notes to be secured. The holder sued on a 
remaining unsecured note. Although the note had been given 
for a portion of the purchase price, it did not run afoul of the 
antideficiency legislation since it was not secured by a deed 
of trust or mortgage. 
The Van Vleck Realty case is not so clear. The trial court 
found that the note was unsecured as a matter of fact, but, 
relying on Bargioni v. Hill,lO concluded that as a matter of 
law the note was part of the obligation secured by a second 
deed of trust and that it was barred by § 580b of the Code 
of Civil Procedure. The appellate court reversed, holding 
that the case is controlled by Roseleat Corp. v. Chierighino,ll 
which pointed out that § 580b discourages overvaluation by 
placing the risk of inadequate security on the purchase-money 
mortgagee, and that this purpose is achieved only if the stat-
utory limitation applies exclusively to security transactions. 
The court also cited Jonathan as authority for holding that 
a note given for the purchase price of property comes under 
the antideficiency statutes only when a security device is used. 
In Baumrucker v. American Mortgage Exchange, Inc.,12 
the plaintiff bought from the defendant notes secured by 
deeds of trust. After default and purchase by the plaintiff, 
one piece of the property was sold for a sum much less than 
the value of the notes, and he found the other property to 
be unmarketable. He thereupon sued defendant for damages, 
including money spent to make the property suitable for rent-
8. 247 Ca1. App.2d 651, 56 Cal. Rptr. 11. 59 Ca1.2d 35, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873, 
14 (1967). ' 378 P.2d 97 (1963). 
9. 250 Cal. App.2d 81, 58 Cal. Rptr. 12. 250 Cal. App.2d 451, 58 Cal. 
246 (1967). Rptr. 677 (1967). 
10. 59 Ca1.2d 121, 28 Ca1. Rptr. 321, 
378 P.2d 593 (1963). 
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ing. The defendant demurred, contending that the suit was 
merely an action for a deficiency judgment following the sale 
of the property under the deed of trust. Numerous violations 
of the Real Property Securities Dealer Law were alleged as 
a basis for the complaint. 13 In overriding the demurrer 
sustained by the lower court on a pleading of § 580d of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, the appellate court held that 
an action under the statute is not an action for a deficiency 
judgment, and therefore Code of Civil Procedure § 580d does 
not apply. 
A case with interesting procedure is Lee v. Ski Run Apart-
ments,14 wherein the plaintiff asserted a right to rents pledged 
in a deed of trust of which plaintiffs were the beneficiaries. 
The defendant had defaulted the senior encumbrance, which 
also constituted a default of the terms of the plaintiff's deed 
of trust. Judgment was given for the plaintiff for a sum of 
money not prayed for in the complaint. The defendant ap-
pealed on the basis that a default judgment is void and may 
be appealed when the relief granted by the judgment is greater 
than that asked for in the complaint. Is In its decision the 
court stated the general rule that a trustor in possession of 
the property is entitled to the rents and profits, and that absent 
an actual assignment of rents and profits, the beneficiary has 
only a security interest. Otherwise, a beneficiary must actu-
ally acquire lawful possession by consent or lawful procedure, 
or must secure the appointment of a receiver in order to perfect 
his claim to the rents. The court reversed on the rule that 
a money judgment not prayed for was beyond the juris-
dictional limits of the court, but remanded the case for a 
decision on the question of receivership. 
An action to enjoin a bank from selling property in default 
of payment by the purchaser was denied in Kemple v. Security 
First National Bank of Los Angeles. I6 The federal statute 
provides that "no attachment, injunction, or execution shall 
be issued against [a national banking association] or its prop-
13. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 10237- 15. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 580. 
10238.7. 16. 249 Cal. App.2d 719, 57 Cal. 
14. 249 Cal. App.2d 298, 57 Cal. Rptr. 838 (1967). 
Rptr. 496 (1967). 
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erty before final judgment in any suit [or] action . . . in 
any State . . . court.,,17 In rejecting appellant's argument 
that the statute applied only when a national banking asso-
ciation's efficiency would be impaired, the court cited and 
quoted from a recent case ruling that had settled the issue 
adversely to appellant. 1s Thus the Superior Court below did 
not have jurisdiction to grant a preliminary injunction. 
In the absence of provisions to the contrary, insurance pro-
ceeds payable to a beneficiary of a deed of trust operate to 
reduce the debt pro tanto, and the beneficiary is not required 
to apply the proceeds to any particular instalment of the 
note. Therefore, even though the proceeds of the insurance 
are paid to the beneficiary, if the trustor does not thereafter 
make payments according to the terms of the note, the benefi-
ciary may give notice of default and proceed with sale of the 
property under power of sale. So held Lee v. Murphy.19 
The insurance clause contained in the trust deed was the 
typical provision found in most deeds of trust, which permits 
the proceeds to apply to the indebtedness secured and in such 
order as the beneficiary may determine. The court held that 
this provision as to order applies where there is more than 
one indebtedness, but where there is only one debt, the pro 
tanto rule applies. 
Vendor and Purchaser 
Closely related to the problems of security discussed above 
is the problem of liquidated damages in a contract to sell. 
In Greenbach Bros., Inc. v. Burns,20 the vendor sought to 
recover the deposit made into escrow. After judgment for 
the vendor, court granted vendee's motion for a new trial. 
On appeal the court held that the amount deposited in escrow 
had no bearing on the damages and did not satisfy the provi-
sion of Civil Code § 1671 that liquidated damages are allow-
able where damages are impractical or impossible to ascertain. 
17. 12 U.S.C. § 91. 19. 253 Cal. App.2d 244, 61 Cal. 
18. See First Nat'!. Bank v. Superior Rptr. 174 (1967). 
Court, 240 Cal. App.2d 109, 49 Cal. 20. 245 Cal. App.2d 767, 54 Cal. 
Rptr 358, cert. denied 385 U.S. 829, 17 Rptr. 143 (1966). 
L.Ed.2d 65, 87 S.Ct. 65 (1966). 
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The fact that the purchaser asked for additional time in which 
to secure financing, and as a condition of this, he was required 
to deposit an additional sum into escrow, aided the court in 
finding that the deposits were purely arbitrary. 
Other vendor-purchaser problems arise when dealing with 
escrows. Two cases 1 stand for the proposition that once the 
escrow instructions satisfy the statute of frauds requirements, 
it is possible to introduce parol evidence as to the actual agree-
ment between the parties. The purpose of an escrow is to 
carry out an agreement of sale; an escrow does not supplant 
the basic agreement. 
Easement Problems 
In Pettis v. General Telephone Company,S the plaintiff 
sought to quiet title to his property as against utility easements 
of the defendants. Prior to its acquisition by the plaintiff, 
the property had been condemned by the state to build a 
freeway. The utility companies involved were requested to 
relocate the utilities, and did so. Later, it was determined 
that the property was excess property, and the state deeded 
the property to the predecessor of plaintiff. There was no 
mention of the location of the utilities in the deed given by 
the state or in the deed to plaintiff. At the trial of the action, 
the utility companies said that action was without merit as 
to them, and moved for a summary judgment under Code 
of Civil Procedure § 437c. The motion was granted and, 
upon appeal, reversed. The court held that the motion was 
not proper upon affidavits, given both in support of and in 
opposition to the motion, if there was any triable issue of 
fact. Therefore, the question was whether plaintiff, as he 
alleged, was without notice of the easements when he pur-
chased. If he was such a purchaser, his rights were prior to 
that of the utility companies. In such a case, then, the utility 
companies would be able to show that the public use of the 
1. Goodman v. Community Savings 2. 66 Cal.2d 503, 58 Cal. Rptr. 316, 
& Loan Ass'n., 246 Cal. App.2d 13, 54 426 P.2d 884 (1967). 
Cal. Rptr. 456 (1966); Leiter v. Eitinge, 
246 Cal. App.2d 306, 54 Cal. Rptr. 703 
(1966). 
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utilities required maintaining their utility lines through plain-
tiff's property, and the plaintiff would be relegated to the 
remedy of damages as in inverse condemnation. 
In Franceschi v. Kuntz3 a nonexclusive easement was con-
veyed to the buyer upon a sale of land and timber rights. The 
land and rights were subsequently reconveyed, and thereafter 
the timber rights were assigned to a number of successive 
assignees. The original seller contended that the easement 
was not transferable to the assignees. The court held that 
an easement may be granted to anyone entitled to make use 
of the dominant estate and that the easement attaches to that 
estate. Although the title to the property may not have 
passed, the dominant owner may transfer the timber rights 
and grant the purchaser of those timber rights the easement 
of access. 
In a different vein, upon a partition of land, it was held 
in Worchester v. Worchester4 that an easement may not be 
attached to land other than that being partitioned unless 
there is an agreement to the contrary. It makes no difference 
that the land to which the easement is made appurtenant 
belonged to one of the parties to the action; it must be part 
of the land partitioned. 
In conclusion, an example of the proposition that much 
litigation leads to strange results is First & C Corporation v. 
W encke. 5 An action by a successor vendee against the ven-
dor was brought on an agreement giving the vendor posses-
sion after the purchase. The court found that the agreement 
essentially created an estate at will, and since no rent was 
reserved, no rent need be paid. Further, a provision in the 
lease provided for the erection of a building by the vendee 
and the offer of quarters in the building to the vendor. One 
portion of this provision called for a lease to the vendor with 
a yearly option to renew for a total of 10 years. Now here 
is the bombshell. The court said that this provision violates 
3. 253 Cal. App.2d 1138, 61 Cal. 5. 253 Cal. App.2d 805, 61 Cal. Rptr. 
Rptr. 810 (1967). 531 (1967). 
4. 246 Cal. App.2d 56, 54 Cal. Rptr. 
436 (1966). 
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the rule against perpetuities and cites Haggerty v. City of 
Oakland6 as authority. The court did not even cite Wong v. 
DiGrazia,7 nor did it state that a reasonable interpretation 
of the instrument at bar would, as a matter of law, be one 
that could not be performed within a reasonable time. Per-
haps this is an application of the old saw "small cases make 
bad law." 
6. 161 Cal. App.2d 407, 326 P.2d 7. 60 Cal.2d 525, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241, 
957, 66 AL.R.2d 718 (1958). 386 P.2d 817 (1963). 
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